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Introduction [A] 
In the last decades most European countries have promoted a labor market deregulation, under the 
assumption that rigid protection was the main reason for the persistent share of unemployment and 
long-term unemployment. In some countries these reforms have just been juxtaposed to the already-
present regulation, de facto increasing the existing fracture among the core workforce, namely the 
adult male workers, relatively permanently hired, and a growing share of workers exposed to an 
unstable labor market participation, young people, women, and workers with a minority background 
in particular. One of the most relevant consequences of such transformation is a reduction of 
boundaries between employment and unemployment, and the rise of discontinuity, thus 
reconfiguring the “old” risk of being totally excluded from the labor market into the “new” risk, 
associated with post-industrial societies, of being temporarily, unstably, and therefore loosely, 
integrated (Ranci 2010).  
Although forms of non-standard jobs differ considerably, and their regulation varies across 
countries, they often display several elements associated to insecurity: instability of income, but 
also of professional status, an inadequate salary, limited protection against arbitrary dismissal and 
on-the-job risks, reduced access to training, and lack of representation by intermediate bodies. 
These elements of job insecurity, combined with the lower degree of protection against social risks 
(especially unemployment, but also illness, pregnancy and old age) that non-standard contracts 
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generally give entitlement to, may generate precariousness, understood as the impossibility to build 
a career and to clearly identify oneself with an occupation, in conditions of limited rights and 
protections. The degree of precariousness is in fact deeply influenced by the overall architecture of 
the social protection system, particularly the presence or absence of universalistic income support 
measures, and the accessibility and effectiveness of public employment services. 
The increase of work precariousness is one of the factors that have contributed to the rise of social 
vulnerability (see chapter 1). Social vulnerability does not identify a state of material deprivation or 
poverty, but rather a situation of instability and in a context of harsh constraints within one or more 
of the main systems of social integration: family, welfare, or labor market (Ranci 2010). In this 
multidimensional condition, each of these domains may contribute to the fragility of the individuals. 
A worker with an unstable job might in fact not be vulnerable per se, but might become so in 
presence of other conditions, such as scant welfare protection or weak family support. 
The exposure to work precariousness varies depending on different variables, such as education, 
skills, type of occupation, but also gender, ethnic origins, and age (Kalleberg 2009). Young people 
are especially affected by it (Blossfeld et al. 2005, Kahn 2007, Baranowska and Gebel 2010, 
Lancker 2012). As a consequence, in recent decades the transition from school to work has become 
a longer and blurrier period, in which - more than in “traditional” unemployment, defined as the 
absence of work (Esping-Andersen 2002) - young adults are stuck in a “gray zone” of fixed term 
contracts, occasional jobs, involuntary part-time occupations, internships, training, and education 
initiatives. This condition of continuous uncertainty in the labor market might jeopardize their 
transition to stability (Walther 2011) and put into question their capacity of planning and realizing 
an independent life (Côté and Bynner 2008), although with uneven impacts. Those who cumulate 
several factors of weakness on the labor market, such as women, the low-educated, and those with a 
foreign or minority background, are more exposed to the risk of work precariousness (Blossfeld et 
al. 2005).  
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This chapter aims to address in a comparative perspective the experiences of occupational 
precariousness of young adults, the consequences on their social vulnerability, and the contribution 
in terms of protection and support offered by local welfare policies. In the next paragraph we 
present the research design. In the third paragraph recent data about labor market participation of 
young people in Europe are illustrated. In the fourth paragraph we identify five profiles of young 
people facing employment instability. In the fifth paragraph we examine the size and composition 
of the resource packages they can rely upon. The sixth paragraph discusses how work 
precariousness affects the living conditions of young adults, and their overall strategies to improve 
them. Finally, the last paragraph draws some conclusions. 
 
The research [A] 
The analysis presented in this chapter is based on part of the empirical results of the WILCO 
project1. The objective of the research was to deepen the actual conditions of vulnerability of young 
people, and the factors that may be detected at the basis of it, as well as the resources they can have 
access to and that can act as protective factors against further downturns. In order to do that, the 
biographies of 120 young Europeans were collected.  
The focus of the analysis was on young adults with a low educational profile, a group especially 
exposed to the risk of being precariously employed, or unemployed (Isengard 2003, Baranowska 
and Gebel 2010). In fact, people with a low education level are comparatively less employed and 
earn less (OECD 2012), and education has become increasingly important as a determinant of life 
chances, especially since welfare protection and representation by intermediate corps have 
																																								 																				
1 “Social innovations at the local level in favour of cohesion” (www.wilcoproject.eu). We warmly 
thank the researchers who contributed to the fieldwork, and all the young respondents who shared 
with us their – often heavy – experiences. 
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weakened in the last decades (Kalleberg 2009). Coherently, the sample included young people 
either jobless or employed on a very unstable basis; with a low education level (maximum ISCED 3 
and no university education); either living autonomously, or being eager to live autonomously, but 
living with their family of origin because of clearly insufficient economic means. Interviewees were 
selected between the ages of 18, as younger people are still in compulsory education, and 33, as the 
process of transition to adulthood–the achievement of full independence from the family of origin–
has been diversified2, postponed, and extended up to 30 years of age and over, especially (but not 
only) in Southern European countries (Walther 2006).  
The in-depth interviews were based on a semi-structured questionnaire, organized in four main 
areas: personal and household situation; individual path through education and labor market 
participation; resources mobilized/accessed to deal with work instability (namely income support; 
training, activation measures and job search actions; access to information and emotional support; 
housing conditions); influence of work precariousness on individual wellbeing and coping 
strategies.  
The interviews were carried out in twenty cities in ten European countries, covering all welfare 
regimes 3. Whereas quite many qualitative studies of the experiences of young unstable workers 
																																								 																				
2 The order of completion of “sub-transitions”–finding a stable job, leaving one’s parents’ dwelling, 
forming an autonomous household, having children–that used to be linear and prevalent in the 
industrial era, now follows a rather differentiated range of sequences (Guillemard 2005). 
3 The twenty cities are: Zagreb and Varaždin (Croatia), Lille and Nantes (France), Münster and 
Berlin (Germany), Amsterdam and Nijmegen (the Netherlands), Milan and Brescia (Italy), Warsaw 
and Płock (Poland), Barcelona and Pamplona (Spain), Malmö and Stockholm (Sweden), Bern and 
Geneva (Switzerland), Medway and Birmingham (UK). The interviews were carried out in nine 
languages and translated into English by the national research teams. 
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have by now been produced in specific national or local contexts in Europe (Fullin 2004, Bertolini 
et al. 2011), an in-depth analysis of individual narratives comparing such a wide array of European 
contexts is rather new. Also quite rare in previous investigations is the interest on the city as the 
context in which work precariousness is concretely experienced and dealt with. The added value of 
the research presented here is exactly the comparative focus on the local level. 
 
Young Europeans and the labor market4 [A] 
Youth (15-24) and young adults (25-34) are more at risk of labor market marginalization than other 
age groups also because they are more exposed to temporary jobs, thus leading to a higher risk of 
being laid off than older workers (Blossfeld et al. 2005, Baranowska and Gebel 2010). Furthermore, 
the crisis was sharper for some profiles, as low-skilled, temporarily-employed and young workers 
(OECD 2012). The average youth unemployment rate (under 25), that had decreased to 15.7 percent 
in 2007, has been growing to 22.9 percent in 2012 (EU-27, source: Eurostat). The impact of the 
crisis on unemployment rates is, however, mediated by national economic performance and, 
compared to adults, young people are strongly affected by institutional mechanism, as long as the 
key process in their labor market integration is the school-to-work transition (Dietrich 2012). The 
rate of unemployment among young people under the age of 25 in 2012 was 53.2 percent in Spain, 
35.3 percent in Italy, and 41.7 percent in Croatia, while being below 10 percent in Germany and the 
Netherlands (source: Eurostat). Although these data should be read against the backdrop of activity 
rates that are particularly low for this age group, since many young people are still exclusively or 
predominantly students (see chapter 3), their unemployment trends during the crisis is nevertheless 
																																								 																				
4 All tables and graphs in this paragraph will report data referring to the ten countries involved in 
the WILCO project, in order to frame the labor market contexts in which our interviewees act. Main 
source of data is Eurostat Statistical database, European Labour Force Indicators. 
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rather worrying, and will be one of the main axes of intervention of European social policies in the 
near future (Social Europe 2012). 
 
Figure 7.1 – Young people in education/training and in the labor market in the WILCO 
countries, 15-24 years old in 2007/2012. Source: Eurostat, EU 27. 
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Figure 7.2 – Young people in education/training and in the labor market in the WILCO 
countries, 25-34 years old in 2007/2012. Source: Eurostat, EU 27. 
 
Employment rates have diminished among young people in Europe-27, with the exception of 
Germany, where employment rates increased even among the 15- to 24-year-olds. The decline of 
employment rates is mirrored by an increase in education and training activities, especially in those 
countries where youth employment has been particularly hit by the crisis, such as Spain (OECD 
2012). One important institutional difference among countries relates to how their education system 
combines theoretical learning and work experience, which can also have important consequences on 
early labor market transitions (Blossfeld et al. 2005). In some European countries, like Germany 
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and the Netherlands, it is quite common for students to be also involved in the labor market, also 
thanks to the dual education system and measures of stimulus for employers and/or mentoring for 
young people (European Foundation 2012). On the contrary, in Southern Europe, where measures 
to support school-to-work transition are particularly weak, less than one young person in four is 
active in the labor market, and only a small minority is working and studying at the same time. 
Despite their small numbers, active young people in Southern Europe are reducing their 
employment during the crisis more than their German or Swiss peers. 
In Southern Europe, however, the highest percentage increment has been in the number of young 
people who are neither involved in education or training nor in employment (Social Europe 2012). 
This is especially evident for the older segment of youth (25-34 years old) in which the persistence 
and increment of a NEET condition might be considered a risk of long-term exclusion from labor 
market. In Spain, Croatia and Italy this condition concerns about 30% of the total population 25-34. 
Young adults (19 and 24) have been the group most affected by the crisis (OECD 2012). Although 
in almost all the countries studied, youth and young adults experience periods of unemployment 
that are sensibly shorter than those of older workers, one other side effect of the crisis was a general 
increase in the average duration of unemployment, which leads to an increase in the number of 
long-term unemployed and discouraged job-seekers, with the sharpest increment among young 
adults (Dietrich 2012, OECD 2012). Moreover, unemployment is not a transitory condition for 
young adults either, especially in certain countries (Italy, Spain, Poland, and Croatia). The 
persistence of a condition of unemployment might be particularly hard for workers who are at the 
beginning of their professional career: the so-called “scarring effect” may jeopardize integration 
into the labor market and reduce future earnings prospects. 
Furthermore, if we consider the activity rate, the data gives us a different picture, since just a 
minority of those under 25 years of age is active on the labor market, with the relevant exception of 
Germany, Poland and Croatia. In Spain and Italy, a higher share of young adults in the total 
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population are suffering from unemployment compared to their youngest peers, who are usually less 
active on the labor market. 
Figure 7.3 – Inactivity, employment, and unemployment rate by age in WILCO countries 
(Youth: 15-24, young adults: 25-34, adults: 35-64), 2012. Source: Eurostat, EU 27. 
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Among the employed, young people tend to be overrepresented in the temporary work category 
compared to other age groups, confirming a trend established in the 2000s. The distribution of 
temporary and part-time jobs among them was 35.9 percent of the total employment rate in 2001, 
and reached about 42,1 percent in 2012. Young people’s exposure to temporary employment has 
been worsened by the crisis. Nevertheless, the meaning of temporary employment for young 
workers also depends on the structural features of the education and welfare system. In dual 
education systems like the German one, it is partly linked to parallel participation in education and 
training, while in the Nordic countries, which promote policies to support the achievement of 
autonomy from an early age (housing support, employment services), it can constitute an 
opportunity (Social Europe 2012). In absence of these conditions it is more often a factor of 
precariousness, as it usually happens in Southern Europe. 
Another effect of the crisis was a general increase in the use of part-time employment (OECD 
2012). Even if not as strongly as for temporary employment (Social Europe 2012), the crisis forced 
especially young unemployed adults to unwillingly accept part-time jobs, exposing them to the risk 
of being underemployed or worse, becoming part of the working poor (Lancker 2012). In the EU-
27, underemployed young people between the ages of 15 and 24 made up 5.5 percent of the total 
labor force in 2007, but in 2011 they accounted for 7.7 percent, reaching their highest levels in 
Spain (16.8 percent), Sweden (14.6 percent), and the UK (14.5 percent). The rate of involuntary 
part-time within total part-time employment in the EU-27 has grown from 23.2 to 28 percent in the 
same period; Italy (70 percent), Spain (51 percent), and France (45.2 percent) show the highest 
mismatch for the 15- to 24-year-old workers. The risk of poor quality employment might result in a 
long-term impact on earnings and status, especially in the case of the low-skilled (OECD 2012). 
Besides being mediated by the national regulation of labor markets and the contingent economic 
trends, and conditioned by individual skills, the risk of being unemployed or unstably integrated in 
the labor market is also influenced by social characteristics, especially ethnicity and gender, and by 
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the structural opportunities of the local systems of production (Russell and O’Connell 2001, 
Isengard 2003, Baranowska and Gebel 2010, Escott 2012, Dietrich 2012). Being a migrant in 
general, and particularly being a young migrant, increases the risk of unemployment in almost all 
the WILCO countries, with the only exceptions being Italy and the UK, and the crisis increased this 
gap in the EU-27 (Dietrich 2012). Migrants usually have lower language skills and they encounter 
difficulties having their educational qualifications recognized outside their country of origin, and 
may undergo discrimination in the labor market (Isengard 2003).  
The analysis of gender gaps is more complicated. In fact, if women are less unemployed than men 
in the 15-24 age group, the tendency changes for women during their most fertile years (25-39) 
when they may have their own family and children. If the unemployment rate of young women was 
significantly higher before the crisis than that of young men, this trend has changed with the crisis, 
which has influenced more sectors, like manufacturing or construction, where young men are 
traditionally concentrated (Dietrich 2012), whereas women are more employable than men in the 
service sectors. In fact, local productive systems that still retain an industrial core, like in Italy, 
France, or Poland, offer fewer jobs for women. On the contrary, countries - like the UK - that have 
experienced a stronger decline in manufacturing in the past currently favor the employability of 
women more (Isengard 2003), although there is strong occupational segregation (Escott 2012). 
Locality is more important for low-skilled workers, to the extent that their lack of education and 
employability reduces their competitiveness on the national or even international labor market, thus 
limiting them more to the opportunities offered within their area of residence (Escott 2012). Taking 
into consideration the role of local (regional) productive systems, the situation of young 
unemployed adults varies a lot among the twenty cities studied, but quite coherently with the 
general performance of local labor markets (see chapter 3). As we can see from table below, Berlin 
and Birmingham have more unemployment at the regional level than the national average, while the 
	 12	
situation in Milan/Brescia, Pamplona, Barcelona, Münster, and Warsaw is better than that of their 
respective countries as a whole.  
 
Table 7.1  Unemployment rate, 15-34 years old, Regional and Country, 2006 - 2011.  
 
2006  2011  Diff. 2006/2011 
 Regional Country  Regional Country  Regional Country 
         
Berlin 13.69 7.88  8.52 5.06  -5.17 -2.82 
Münster 7.54 7.88  4.95 5.06  -2.59 -2.82 
Barcelona 5.94 8.15  13.46 20.36  7.52 12.21 
Pamplona 6.33 8.15  19.05 20.36  12.72 12.21 
Nantes 11.05 8.63  11.76 9.25  0.71 0.62 
Lille 7.23 8.62  8.47 9.25  1.24 0.63 
Milan/Brescia 4.19 7.05  6.01 8.33  1.82 1.28 
Amsterdam 3.09 3.72  4.07 4.49  0.98 0.77 
Nijmegen 3.35 3.72  4.73 4.49  1.38 0.77 
Warsaw/Płock 9.62 10.88  7.22 8.61  -2.40 -2.27 
Stockholm 6.96 8.64  7.73 9.29  0.77 0.65 
Malmö 9.6 8.64  10.18 9.29  0.58 0.65 
Birmingham 8.24 6.44  12.04 9.47  3.80 3.03 
Medway 6.59 6.44  10.98 9.47  4.39 3.03 
Geneva 5.72 4.58  7.14 4.62  1.42 0.04 
Bern 4.29 4.58  3.96 4.62  -0.33 0.04 
Zagreb/Varaždin : 10.37  : 13.42   3.05 
         
Source: Eurostat database 2006/2011. 
If we take a deeper look at the transformation between 2006 and 2011, we notice that the worst 
increases in youth unemployment occurred in the regions of Barcelona (+7.52 percent), Pamplona 
(+12.72 percent), and Medway (+4.39 percent). Birmingham and Milan/Brescia show a lower 
increase (+3.8 percent and +1.82 percent). Cities like Bern, as well as Polish and German cities, 
seem to not have suffered from the financial crisis. Instead, they saw their youth unemployment rate 
reduced, even more than at the national level. The evolution of unemployment and youth 
unemployment in Barcelona, Pamplona, and Medway seems closely related to the burst of the real 
estate bubble and the crisis in construction particularly important in the previous period (see chapter 
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3). However, as table 7.1 shows, in all the cities studied young people have not suffered from the 
crisis at the same levels. Locality seems important in explaining the relative trends. 
The regions where Stockholm and Bern are located have succeeded in promoting a wider 
participation of young people (15-24), while Berlin and Münster were more effective with young 
adults (25-34). On the contrary, the regions where Barcelona, Pamplona, Geneva, Medway and the 
Italian and Dutch cities are embedded saw a reduction in employment rates among the youngest age 
groups, even with a sharp difference in Spain and Medway. In Malmö and Birmingham as Croatian 
cities employment rates were reduced especially among young adults. Some local labor markets 
seem more insidious for young adults than for young people in general. Thus, young people suffer 
more from the economic crisis, especially in those countries in which the male breadwinner model 
is more persistent, as in Spain and Italy, but also in cities like Medway and Amsterdam, where some 
resources for the activation of the most fragile have undergone austerity-linked cuts (see chapter 3). 
 
Figure 7.4 – Variation in the employment rate for youth (15-24) and young adults (25-34), 
2007 – 2012. Source: Eurostat, NUTS 2. 
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In conclusion, structural factors (age, gender, and migrant background) play a role in configuring 
the opportunities for young people on the labor market, together with the education level and 
locality (the features of local production systems and of local welfare provisions). Macro data 
depict a broad landscape of the main trends occurring in the labor market, but do not give 
information on trajectories and strategies by which young people try to overcome instability and 
precariousness, nor on the type and generosity of resources they can rely upon for support. After 
having illustrated the position of young Europeans on the labor market, highlighting common trends 
and relevant differences among countries and local contexts, we shall now focus on the narratives 
about their experience of work precariousness that emerged from the interviews. We will first 
concentrate on the paths young people take to access the labor market, identifying different profiles 
of work precariousness, and then analyze the packages of resources they can rely on to deal with 
their situation of work instability.  
 
From unemployment to precariousness: five different profiles of youth at risk [A] 
Most of our interviews confirm that the conditions of young people can really not be conceived as 
standard unemployment conditions, but rather consist of a gray zone of weak integration in the 
labor market. Their working biographies are discontinuous and made up of episodes of 
unemployment (quite often the result of the expiration of a temporary contract), that are followed by 
occasional jobs, temporary contracts, or failed efforts of starting apprenticeships or university. 
Education is still considered by most of the interviewees to be the key factor in permanently 
accessing the labor market, even if not all of them are aware that their unstable condition might be 
caused by their weak professional profile. Having a higher education or specialized qualification 
eases the transition into the labor market and reduces the risk of unemployment (Isengard 2003). 
Many of our interviewees do not meet any of these two conditions, as a result of two processes. The 
most fragile cases dropped out from school before achieving a full professional profile, which 
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makes it quite difficult for them to access qualified jobs. Others do have a professional 
qualification, which is nevertheless inadequate for the labor market demands, either because school 
did not really prepare them practically for the desired jobs, or because the market segment in which 
they would like to work is narrow or in crisis. However, albeit conditioned by low education and by 
their motivation, their unstable labor market integration seems influenced by a sum of weaknesses, 
including fragile family contexts and a chain of frail biographical steps, and by the framework of 
opportunities and constraints offered by the local production and welfare system. This confirms that 
vulnerability stems from an individual fragility in different dimensions that reinforce one another 
(Ranci 2010). 
Among our 120 interviewees we identified five profiles based on a multifaceted combination of 
individual elements defining their anyway weak, but differentiated position on the labor market. 
Our aim was to assess on the one hand the level of their social integration in two main institutions, 
school and the labor market, and on the other hand the personal assets they can rely on in order to 
pursue not only employability but also possibly stabilization. These include also their agency since, 
besides public regulation of work, the multi-faceted concept of insecurity also comprises effective 
capacity of the worker to obtain employment continuity (Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt 2010). The 
main elements considered were: the age at which they had their first “serious” job (excluding 
occasional and seasonal jobs), if they ever had one; having a stable past job experience (at least 2 
years) or not; the number and duration of accumulated job experiences; the number and length of 
spells of unemployment or inactivity; their educational and training path and achievements; the 
presence of a professional project guiding their experiences and job search.  
Quite surprisingly, our results show no strong association between any profile and characteristics 
such as gender or migrant background; rather, such elements act as catalysts of vulnerability, 
worsening the condition of interviewees compared to the male native job seeker, but the effects are 
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different for each profile. The profiles seem to be transversal with respect to WILCO countries and 
cities. We will go back to this point at the end of the chapter. 
 
Young and fragile [B] 
A first group of interviewees (14) had just exited the education system, in some cases achieving a 
basic professional qualification but more often just dropping out of it. Their careers as students had 
often been unstable and fragmented, also because they have no clear idea yet of what profession 
they would pursue. They were still quite young (under 20 on average) and their work experiences 
had been mostly temporary or protected by youth activation programs. Many of these respondents 
had been employed as seasonal workers in retail, personal services, or tourism, sometimes even 
without contracts. Their profile was often particularly fragile, not only for the insecurity they had 
experienced, both in the education system and on the labor market, but also because they came from 
unstable and problematic families. 
During their unemployment spells, they hoped for the right occasion that might lead to a more 
stable labor market integration, like an apprenticeship, to gain a more solid professional experience, 
or more vaguely waited for someone to propose them “something to do”. The role of the social 
services in activating their agency was determinant, especially if they had a migrant background. 
“I was doubting a little, whether I should continue studying or not, so I 
didn't do anything for 2 or 3 months, just thinking if I was going to go back 
to school or look for a job. And then I decided to get a job because I wanted 
to earn money, help my parents and stuff, and so I started looking for a 
job.” (Man, 25, Amsterdam) 
The most insidious risk derived from their passivity, which might lead them to a NEET condition if 
they were not adequately supported by their family or by services. In fact, their lack of motivation 
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and orientation might jeopardize the development of a professional project, and push them toward a 
situation of exclusion from both the labor market and the education system. 
 
Flexible with a professional project [B] 
A small group of respondents (9) was made up of persons just slightly older than the previous ones 
(around 24 years old on average) but who, on the contrary, had developed a rather specific 
professional project they tried to pursue. Their projects often focused on creative or artistic fields: 
filmmaking, dancing, writing. These people were not simply accepting the first job offer that might 
arrive, but they were trying to build a definite occupational profile coherent with their specialization 
objective. Their approach was strategic, as they alternated or combined job experiences with 
training to build a set of competencies useful in their field of interest. Quite often they were favored 
by the fact of still being young enough to access starter contracts favorable for employers, thus 
being competitive with respect to older workers even if they lacked experience. Since training often 
has a cost that they cannot meet without support, some had temporary, instrumental jobs, just to 
cover basic needs while studying or getting further training.  
The most serious risk they faced was the failure of their professional project. Despite their 
motivation, this may occur not only due to business cycles and competition (quite tough especially 
in the most creative sectors, like movie-making or radio entertainment), but also because the links 
between the education system and labor market are lacking. 
“I'm precarious as a life-style., It is probably due to the fact that in Italy 
there aren't many opportunities for young people. You have the chance to 
learn a job at school, but it's hard to do it in practice afterwards. Many 
young people have good ideas in creative sectors, but it's hard to establish a 
real career, particularly in my field [filmmaking].” (Man, 28, Milan) 
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Young people in this group were ready to face periods of unemployment, as long as these were 
functional to obtain an apprenticeship in their field of interest, or better job offers. To be able to use 
such a strategy, the role of family or social support is fundamental. Nevertheless, their genuine 
interest in a specific field kept their motivation high and constant, and their coherence was rewarded 
by the fact that they were able to obtain longer job contracts (17 months on average). 
 
Precarious with fragmented paths [B] 
A large number of interviewees (48) had been able to work more or less continuously in the past 
years, but had not been able to develop a professional project yet; they were simply browsing the 
labor market to grab the best job offer they could find on the short term. They were facing the 
insidious risks of entrapment into precariousness, as their CVs got more and more fragmented and 
they had neither been able to build a coherent professional profile, nor to achieve a job that offered 
them more stable integration into the labor market.  
Even if they experienced the shortest spells of unemployment among our interviewees (less than 6 
months on average), these were often followed by very short contracts of a few weeks or even days. 
Their philosophy was just to accept the first job offer they got in order to cover their basic needs. 
Their unstable labor market integration may get worse as years passed by, since their eclecticism 
did not allow them to accumulate a critical mass of professional experience so as to be competitive 
in a sector or profession. 
“If I have to make a CV now, I think I can fill up 3 pages at least... My 
parents always told me: 'make sure you have an income'… so at some point 
I was just too quick to accept anything I was offered…. I have not been 
critical enough in choosing something I really liked, I just had to have an 
income… I don't think I can count the number of jobs I had on one hand…. 
Maybe 15 different employers? And whether that helped me in my career? 
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Well, if I look at where I was when I was 18 and where I am now, then no.” 
(Man, 30, Amsterdam) 
This extremely short-term arrangement puts into question young people’s planning capacity, in 
terms of leaving their family of origin and establishing a new household, but also in terms of 
building a career. In Southern European cities (Pamplona and Barcelona, Milan and Brescia), the 
deregulation of temporary contracts implemented at the national level in the past decades has 
boosted the diffusion of these highly precarious profiles, increasing the vulnerability of young 
workers since there is no law against social dumping. Our interviewees often reported being obliged 
to accept jobs that were clearly underpaid.  
This never-ending instability had brought a general mistrust toward the market: only a minority 
among them thought that finding a new job could be the solution for their currently difficult 
situation, as it would probably be as short and dead-end as the previous ones. Many just had no idea 
of what to do in the next months, so simply pushing them to activate themselves did not seem to be 
an effective strategy for public services to implement.  
 
Marginal and weak [B] 
These respondents (34) were confronted with the most difficult paths of labor market integration, 
and were thus particularly at risk for different reasons, not all related to their employability. In most 
cases, these young people had been long-term unemployed (over 18 months on average since their 
last contract), with scarce or very precarious experiences on the labor market and low and 
fragmented educational profiles. Many of them were confronted with a difficult local production 
system, as the old industrial centers in Berlin, Lille and Birmingham (see chapter 3), making their 
integration potential more challenging.  
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In some cases, the suggestion of their PES tutors to use these months of unemployment to get 
trained or re-trained to be better equipped and more competitive once the economy started to 
recover was not welcomed by the interviewees. Quite often in the past they had failed educational 
objectives, without achieving a clear idea yet of what they wanted to do in the future. The result was 
rather often exclusion both from education or training and the labor market.  
“I started technical secondary school to see if I was interested in 
economics; after half a year I stopped this and started an educational 
training. I finished in 2008. Then I started sending applications, but I just 
received refusals. I wanted to work in the social field and took some 
programs, so I worked at the Familienzentrum in 2008 for six months. When 
the contract expired I could have extended it, but I needed a vacation. Later 
I regretted I had not extended that contract.” (Man, 24, Berlin) 
The problem is neither simply their weak agency, nor the failure of the implemented measures. In 
the majority of cases, these young people had gone through difficult situations in the past: they 
came from families at risk (experiencing parents’ hard separation, illness, death, or imprisonment), 
they had difficult migration trajectories, or they had problems with the law (e.g. for drugs or small 
illegal traffics). Harsh political and social events had also marked some of our interviewees’ 
biographies (e.g. the war in Croatia). In some cases, disabilities and disease made their integration 
in the labor market more difficult than for their peers; in others they had to care for family 
members. Both situations diminished their possibility to be employed full-time. For young women, 
an early pregnancy became an obstacle to labor market integration, especially if childcare options 
were lacking in the area where they lived, or after the separation from the child’s father. 
Quite often, these young people were totally cared for by social services, which offered them 
protected labor market experiences, but also income and housing support. However, the quality of 
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these initiatives depends on the generosity of the national and local welfare systems, and thus varies 
a lot among our cities. 
 
Interrupted careers [B] 
The last profile is more typical of our oldest interviewees (27 and over). What is common among 
these (15) persons is past experience with healthy, stable labor market integration, with contracts 
lasting 24 months and more followed by a long unemployment period (20 months and more). The 
reasons why they were not able to find another job after their last contract were quite gender-
oriented. Women felt that their unemployment was correlated to maternity. In fact, being in their 
30s now, they were quite likely either to have young children, and/or to have a baby in the 
subsequent years. Quite often, the previous contract had been interrupted, or not renewed because 
of a pregnancy. In contrast, men understood their exit from the labor market as more correlated to 
business cycles: interviewees quite often blamed the financial crisis for their situation, insofar as 
neither their motivation, nor their experience, nor activation measures seemed sufficient to find a 
job. 
For both men and women, reduced employability might also depend on age: growing older meant 
they could no longer benefit from starters’ contracts incentives. In other cases the temporary 
contract they had was not renewed since public regulation imposed, after a certain number of 
extensions, to transform it into a permanent one, which their previous employer did not want to do. 
“I've been a hairdresser for 11 years but now I've been unemployed since 
about 2 years. I didn't want to change jobs, it's just that I didn't find a job 
anymore, also because I'm out of the age group for apprenticeship 
contracts. This is a real limit for me and that's one of the reasons why I'm 
doing other courses to try to change jobs.” (Woman, 31, Milan) 
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Their unemployment status persists even if they are quite active in looking for a new job or in trying 
to adjust their competencies with training courses in new fields. The major challenge for them will 
be to succeed in overcoming the scarring effect of their long period of unemployment, which might 
later lead to worse job conditions and less career opportunities. 
 
Trapped in the short term or oriented toward the medium term? [B] 
In the five profiles we identified there is one element that might turn the period of uncertainty into a 
window of opportunity: the development of a strategy in the form of a coherent career project. 
“Flexible adults with a professional project” are more careful in choosing the right opportunities, 
and might benefit more from the initiatives taken during their periods of unemployment. However, 
their strategy is not immune to risks: their coherent and specialized profile might not be useful out 
of their specific – highly competitive – sector, or become obsolete. 
For the “young and fragile,” the youngest among our interviewees, the issue at stake is to develop 
their agency and set up a clear idea of what type of career to pursue. For the most vulnerable 
“marginal and weak” group, however, the risk of simply becoming inactive and marginal is always 
present. For these young people the role of public services is particularly important, as it is quite 
often the only welfare pillar they can access with some continuity and reliability. For both profiles, 
the activation approach is effective if it is oriented to medium-term objectives: encompassing 
structures like the Second Chance School in Nantes offer the necessary support to build a coherent 
professional profile that may sustain a better and permanent integration into the labor market in the 
future. 
For our “precarious with a fragmented path” group, temporary employment does mean entrapment 
in a long-lasting series of unstable job experiences (Barbieri and Scherer 2009) that prevents them 
from building up a coherent profile despite a positive attitude of activation toward the labor market. 
The horizon of their strategies is short, oriented just toward returning to employment as soon as 
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possible. Among our interviewees they are the most exposed to commodification, which might 
become particularly insidious for those who are not eligible for any public support.  
In conclusion, our empirical findings show that the condition of work precariousness has a 
diversified impact and meaning for the young experiencing it: individual factors (such as the ability 
to browse the labor market) and institutional factors (such as the capacity of the welfare system to 
support young people) shape the set of opportunities of the individuals, and therefore also their risks 
of being marginalized on the labor market or entrapped in highly precarious jobs.  
 
Resource packages [A] 
Having analyzed the paths of our young interviewees throughout their complex integration in the 
labor market, and identified different profiles of work precariousness, we shall now explore what 
resources these young people can count on in order to cope with their condition of instability and 
build up their own welfare. We investigated their access to resources in five domains: income 
support; training, employment, and activation services; housing solutions; information (about job 
opportunities, useful services, entitlement to welfare measures, housing solutions); and emotional 
support. Such resources vary in generosity, continuity and their actual impact on individual welfare. 
However, it is not only the quantity of resources young people have access to that counts, but also 
the coverage of different needs and the balance among the contributions from different “pillars.” 
Drawing on the classic Polanyi’s spheres of socio-economic integration (1978), we have considered 
the three classic pillars: public welfare, market, and family and primary network. Resources 
stemming from solidarity networks (NGOs, neighborhood associations, and the like) have been 
considered as “public welfare” intervention if third sector bodies implement, entirely or partly, 
programs that in fact represent institutional (publicly financed) schemes, even if experimental or 
local.  
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As expected, given our selection criteria, our interviewees have generally little attachment to the 
market. Currently unemployed, they are either involved in activation programs or protected jobs, or 
work discontinuously, just for a few hours a week, without a contract or even in illegal activities. 
They have little means to purchase employment, training or information services on the market. 
Their connection to the market mainly consists of the initiatives they autonomously undertake to 
look for a job: checking vacancies, sending CVs, visiting firms or employment agencies, pursuing 
self-employment, etc. As we shall see, the degree of importance of public and family resources for 
the people in our sample is more varied.  
By combining the amount and type of resources respondents declared they could rely upon; 
distinguishing the source these stem from; and assessing their continuity, generosity, and impact; 
we identified five different “resource packages” that we will present in this paragraph. 
 
A sound and comprehensive package [B] 
A first group of interviewees (24) could count on a sound and diversified package of resources, 
stemming partly from public welfare, partly from the family, and partly from the market. Moreover, 
some of the resources they could rely upon were characterized by continuity and/or generosity that 
made their impact on overall individual welfare rather significant. Being able to somehow lean on 
all the main pillars reduced their degree of vulnerability, since if one of them should even 
temporarily fall away, they could still count on the other two. 
In fact, these respondents received public income support and had access to public activating 
measures. Moreover, their package was complemented by significant support from the primary 
network. This took the form of income support, housing support (e.g. co-habitation with the family 
of origin, or partner’s parents, or with a partner who owned a dwelling or paid rent), but also 
emotional support, as well as information about the functioning of PES, the entitlement to welfare 
schemes, or acquaintances who might offer a job or affordable housing solutions. A few of these 
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respondents also reported help from the solidarity network (trade unions, local associations, parish) 
that completed their diversified package of resources. 
“My income is made up of unemployment benefits, health care benefits, and 
housing benefits. When it was known that they were not going to extend my 
contract, my employer contacted the public unemployment agency, and then 
I got a letter from them saying 'we sent your papers'. So accessing 
unemployment benefits was basically organized for me... this was great. 
Also, the unemployment agency has some good new initiatives, such as 
employers-jobseekers speed-dating, and if you need help from them, you can 
always ask, about how to write a CV, etc. [Besides sending out CVs] I took 
short [seasonal and undeclared] jobs to have an extra income […], jobs 
recommended by a friend. When it is really necessary, my girlfriend helps 
me out.” (Man, 30 Amsterdam) 
The composed assistance these young people received (this excerpt reminds us that, depending on 
the institutional context, working with a non standard contract does not necessarily mean to be 
excluded from social protection) may help get them through a period of unemployment during 
which they attempted to strengthen their skills. Nevertheless, a majority of them still did not have a 
clear idea of what to do in the future, which exposed them to the risk of becoming dependent on the 
help received, especially public support. Interestingly, almost half of the interviewees we classified 
in this group lived in the British and Swiss cities (especially in Bern and Birmingham), embedded 
in welfare models with a quite liberal approach. 
 
Counting on diversified resources [B] 
Most of our interviewees disposed of a rather diversified package of resources, although more 
limited than the one available to the previous group. Disregarding age, sex, origin, or city they lived 
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in, around one third of the respondents (45), could be classified in this group. Their welfare leaned 
to a certain extent on all three pillars, and they showed a balanced agency, pursuing some access to 
public welfare and some attempts toward labor market integration, and cultivating relations with 
family and friends. Anyway, the patchwork contributions they managed to put together were not 
enough to lift them over a threshold of vulnerability: they often declared that they really needed 
each bit of help they got, even though it cost them a lot to obtain it, otherwise they would not be 
able to make a living. 
“My brother and I live with our uncle. We both have seasonal work every 
now and then. We also get social help. We live well, but always on the edge: 
we must spend very carefully in order to afford basic things, like food and 
bills.” (Man, 25, Varaždin) 
“Having to sign on [for benefits] was the most mortifying experience ever, 
the attitude of other people can be demoralizing as you can't just walk into a 
place and ask for a job now. I would have moved back in with my parents, 
but I have two siblings still living there and the space is tight. So I moved in 
with my grandparents: I am not sure how I would manage without their 
support.” (Woman, 23, Medway) 
This group of young people seems to be quite transversal to the cities in our sample, and therefore 
transversal to employment-related policies available in those localities, which are diversified in 
their scope (see chapter 3). One third of this group has no idea of what to do in the future, which 
puts into question the effectiveness of the support they get. 
 
Relying upon public welfare [B] 
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A number of respondents (22) reported a rather imbalanced package of resources, which relied 
mainly on public welfare support. Apart from the interviewees of the first group, these were the 
ones who accessed public income support most. Their link to the labor market is very weak. They 
received some help from the primary network, but this was often limited to emotional and 
information support, or irregular monetary transfers; only a few of them lived with their family of 
origin or their partner’s. 
This situation was more often observed among men than women, and mostly present within the 
“marginal and weak” profile, characterized by long-term unemployment and personal and family 
difficulties. It was, on the contrary, least present among the interviewees with a (creative) 
professional project, who seemed more interested in strategically looking for professionally oriented 
experiences rather than in soliciting entitlement to welfare measures. It was also less present among 
those in the “precarious with a fragmented path” category, supposedly because in many countries, 
unstable jobs give little access to public support (especially where a universalistic unemployment 
benefit does not exist).  
This “public-welfare” package is in fact more often found in the cities of the occupational, 
universalistic, and liberal welfare models, where entitlement to welfare measures is a subjective 
right and, if conditions are fulfilled, payment is assured as long as the need lasts. Social assistance 
and/or housing support are neither marginal in generosity, nor just paid una tantum. In the 
continental cities as well, family allowances are generous and have a real impact on household 
disposable income when children are present.  
“I receive 1000€ per month from the training program, and 430€ in family 
allowances for the children. When I started to work for the Municipality I 
had priority access to social housing because I lived far away; I also get 
400€/month housing benefit. The father of my son is in prison and I don't 
have a good relationship with my family, except for my sister, who 
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sometimes helps me with the children. Sometimes I put them in the [public] 
after-school center. I have very good and friendly relations with the staff of 
the ‘Second chance School,’ where I also received useful information. I got 
psychological support from other students I met there, and from my 
friends.” (Woman, 25, Nantes) 
By contrast, almost no interviewee with an “all public welfare” package lived in Southern and 
Eastern European cities, where most first-time job seekers and temporary workers with expiring 
contracts are excluded from income maintenance, social assistance entitlement is more uncertain, 
and the duration of support depends more on budget constraints and discretional power of case-
managers. 
The uneven character of this package is, however, risky. If their entitlement to public welfare 
should expire, or generosity or inclusiveness of public programs should be downsized (also linked 
to the current austerity measures), their ability to make ends meet would be seriously jeopardized, 
as they could not count much on family support, either because relations were strained, or because 
their families also suffered from resource scarcity.  
 
Depending on the family [B] 
A small but significant group of interviewees (9) overwhelmingly relied on the support of the 
primary network. Both their housing solutions and income maintenance depended on the help of 
their parents, partners, parents in law, and/or friends. They either continued living with their 
parents, or went back to live them after a period of autonomy, once they lost a job and could not 
afford living independently anymore. In other cases, they lived with siblings or partners, or alone, 
but they could do so because they had inherited the property of a dwelling or the entitlement to live 
in social housing from a parent or grandparent, that is, thanks to a family-derived resource. Parents 
and/or siblings contributed with monetary transfers as well, or, in case of co-habiting partners or 
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relatives, took care of all bills and utilities. Friends, together with relatives, were often also 
gatekeepers of information and important for psychological support and motivation.  
Public support seemed to play a limited role, or was something they indirectly benefited from, due 
to income pooling with, again, their family members (of family allowances, illness benefits, or old-
age pensions of their relatives). Their narratives indicated a mistrust toward, and bad experiences 
with, operators of social services. Their initiative to achieve labor market (re)integration also 
appeared to be rather vague, pointing at quite undefined migration or self-employment projects for 
the future.  
“I live with my sister in a semi-public [cooperative] apartment. My 
grandmother used to live there; when she moved in with my parents, my 
sister and I decided to move into the empty flat. My sister is employed with a 
temporary contract [her sister’s boyfriend, permanently and full-time 
employed, lives with them]. My parents support me financially since I lost 
my job. I never applied for any kind of support from the local labor office. 
The officials aren't nice. I am not even registered as unemployed. […] All 
members of my family cut their expenditures on holidays, leisure, sports. 
[…] My friend, who lives in Korea, helped me to arrange a one-month stay 
there, where I would like to find a job in the future.” (Woman, 25, Warsaw) 
 
“I didn’t consider asking for help at the center for social care because I 
think that is shameful.” (Woman, 21, Varaždin) 
 
Women had more often an “all family” resource package because they depended on their life 
partner’s income, and bore care responsibilities of young children. Men with such a resource 
	 30	
package, instead, generally relied on their parents, with whom they still lived when they were very 
young (under 21). Most of these interviewees lived in eastern cities (Warsaw and Zagreb in 
particular). Interviewees receiving no public income support were overrepresented in these cities, 
together with respondents who reported never having been involved in any activation measures, 
whereas the great majority of young people interviewed were involved in at least one program in all 
the other cities.  
The risk for these young people lies in family overburden. If the family should be burdened with 
additional responsibilities, and/or its income capacity reduced, for instance because of another 
family member losing his or her job, the family collective capacity to cope with its members’ 
vulnerability would be severely jeopardized. Also, if the relations of these respondents with their 
relatives should for some reason deteriorate, they would risk losing their main, or only, source of 
support. In both cases, building a relationship with public welfare agencies from scratch would 
require time, information, and also psychological and emotional energy, which is difficult to 
mobilize for individuals who were never acquainted with those channels. 
 
A limited resource package [B] 
The last group is the most preoccupying in our sample. It gathers 20 young people who relied upon 
very weak (or even absent) resources from all the main pillars. Their degree of vulnerability was the 
highest, since they could barely make ends meet. The primary network support they received was 
often confined to information or emotional help. As for public help, most of them received no 
income support (unemployment benefit or social assistance) at all, and one third of them had never 
had access to any activating program. In some cases their condition was the result of the worsening 
of a previous situation, for instance because their entitlement to income support expired. In some 
others, it was perceived by respondents as a transitional phase toward the achievement of a better 
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situation, because they were about to reach the age when they were eligible for monetary transfers, 
or because they were on a waiting list to join activating programs, or to access social housing. 
Half of the interviewees with this limited resource package live in Southern European cities, what 
confirms that in these contexts, when the degree of family support is low, no other pillar is really 
able to lift people over a threshold of dangerous vulnerability. 
Young adults with a migrant background were overrepresented in this group. Some of them came 
to the country of destination without their family of origin, but those who had relatives in the same 
city could anyway count on primary networks that were less embedded in the local context than 
those of natives. Some reported being disadvantaged by their scant understanding of how social 
services and welfare entitlements worked.  
“In Bulgaria I started working at the age of 13 after my mother died. When I 
moved to Spain, I had many temporary jobs, cleaning houses and in food 
factories. I live with my [unemployed] sister and her son. I can only find 
temporary jobs, with irregular durations, so I cannot plan my life. I have 
applied for housing support, economic support for myself and child support 
for my sister, but I haven't received anything. I don't understand which 
criteria are used to decide who gets what kind of support. I have [only] been 
able to access Spanish courses through some NGOs. No relevant help came 
from my family; some friends have helped me, lending me some money.” 
(Woman, 24, Pamplona) 
Even if there was still a strong motivation to join the labor market, also due to the lack of other 
sources of support, the number of those who had no idea what to do in the future was 
overrepresented in this group compared to others. This is related to the fact that neither training, 
nor having a job had been a real solution for them in the past.  
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Young people juggling between market earnings, family help, public support [B] 
Five different “resources packages” emerge, based on the source, amount, type, and relevance of 
resources respondents rely upon. Two of these packages are rather comprehensive and well-
balanced, founded both on the market, the family, and public support. A first group of interviewees 
gets a “sound and encompassing” resource set, which protects them from a shift into 
impoverishment, while for the second group, these resources are “diversified,” but barely enough to 
keep them on the edge. Two other packages are more imbalanced, being predominantly based on 
only one of the welfare pillars, mainly or exclusively on “public welfare” for the third group, and 
essentially on “family-based” solidarity for the fourth. These two groups are particularly at risk, 
because if the only source they can have access to should be lost (their entitlement to a benefit could 
expire, or their parents could not be able to support them anymore), they would be left with no other 
buffer. Finally, a fifth group is able to gather only a “scant” set of resources, meager and/or short-
termed; although they wish to access more solid back-up, for instance by applying for welfare 
measures, they are either not entitled, or lack relevant information, or do not even understand why 
they are excluded. They are those most at risk among our respondents, since their connection to all 
three spheres is either weak, or producing only minor relief. Combined with different profiles of 
work precariousness, these diverse patterns of access to resources present different challenges to 
local policies. Before discussing this in the concluding paragraph, we shall now go into the impact 
of work instability on the well-being of our respondents. 
 
Facing instability [A] 
Although characterized by diverse profiles of precariousness and relying on different resource 
packages, most of our respondents shared similar overall strategies to cope with their conditions of 
instability, which cross-cut the different cities of residence. These strategies imply changes in or a 
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reorganization of their life expectations and steps, as already noted in previous research (Blossfeld 
et al. 2005).  
A first recurrent overall strategy is the postponement of steps toward autonomy and adulthood 
(exiting parents’ households, living with a partner, having children, etc.) or even, for some of them, 
taking a step backwards, and going back to live with their family of origin. This has consequences 
not only at the individual but also at the societal level, on the reduction of birth rates and the ageing 
of the population (Billari 2004) and thus on the difficult sustainability of social expenditure on the 
medium to long term. Also most of those who live by themselves, heavily rely on the family net: all 
resources available in the (even extended) family are put together in wide income pooling 
strategies. Nevertheless, depending on their family or partners stresses and depresses young adults, 
who feel “behind” compared to an ideal of full autonomy that they believe one should have 
achieved at their age. Those who have come back to live with their parents after a period of 
autonomy complain of a sort of personal regression, and of a feeling of being “treated as a child.” 
“I moved back in with my parents. They've always helped me, but the 
relationship is strained since I moved back, because they treat me like a 
child, not like an adult.” (Woman, 24, Barcelona) 
“This situation has a great influence on my well-being. Maybe we manage 
financially somehow, but I feel as though I don’t earn my own money. I 
would like to achieve something in my life, have a job that I like, complete 
my studies. But I can’t do it now and it really brings me down. I sent so 
many CVs and nobody called me. I didn’t lose my motivation, but it 
generated conflicts between my husband and me.” (Woman, 29, Warsaw) 
A second strategy, the severe reduction of spending, is even more widespread. This means not only 
renouncing everything that is not indispensable (such as leisure activities, sports, holidays), but also 
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cutting down on basic goods (e.g. reducing health expenses or food quality), bearing arrearage (on 
utilities, dwelling rent, car insurance, etc.),  
“Now I go to the food bank once a week. In the beginning, I was ashamed of 
this, but now I see that there are also people coming who have a job, 
because even for them it is not enough. My children also learned to buy 
cheap articles like cheap chocolate and sweets or to look at the price per kg. 
They also know that it is better to buy at the discount shop than at the 
supermarket just around the corner.” (Woman, 28, Münster) 
Many renounce training courses or achieving the driving license, or graduation because they lack 
the money needed for it. This is not the case of “flexible adults with a professional project”, who are 
ready to take loans, or cut on other costs like clothes or housing, in order to get additional training 
that they consider crucial for their career.  
A third strategy of interviewees is to try to increase their income level through different means. 
Many have borrowed money from relatives and friends, or from social services where it is possible; 
some report selling family goods (like minor real estate properties, or the car), or renting out a room 
in their dwelling if they have the possibility to do so. Some are developing migration projects. 
Others undertake minor illegal activities, or are even thinking about extreme solutions, such as 
“selling ovules,” or “having children” in order to receive family allowances and have priority to 
social housing. As expected, those who face the biggest challenges are those who can only rely 
upon limited resources: the severe reduction does impact their basic quality of life, both in terms of 
food and housing. Having a sound and comprehensive package of resources is fundamental to 
sustaining their basic expenses, and helps overcome the present difficult situation, but it does not 
really change their anxiety about the future, especially for those who do not have a clear career 
project. 
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The negative impact of labor market instability on overall well-being is also similar across 
European cities. This is a classical sociological subject–ever since Jahoda, Lazarsfeld, and Zeifel 
(1933) that has regained momentum in recent theories on precariousness (Standing 2011). Despite 
the profound changes employment has undergone in the last decades, being permanently integrated 
in the labor market still remains very important for the sense of identity of individuals. Our young 
interviewees clearly share feelings of distress including anxiety, sadness, loss of confidence and 
self-esteem, negativity, and loss of strategy for the present and of perspective for the future. These 
views also lead to and are reinforced by difficult family relations, and/or psychological and health 
problems, such as depression, rapid changes in weight, and obesity. Some report an effort to 
maintain a routine: waking up early, carrying out everyday activities, doing (inexpensive) sports or 
volunteer work, etc. Others, on the contrary, lose their daily organization, sleeping and lazing 
around all day long, feeling worthless and useless, or even plunging into despair. 
“I just became very lazy. I don’t know what to do, so I’m lying in bed, 
watching TV. But you miss the social contact, really; everybody is at school, 
everybody is busy and you do nothing. That’s very weird. You even get 
irritated sometimes.” (Man, 22, Nijmegen) 
“Unemployment is negative. One needs to work, otherwise day after day you 
feel you are wasting your time, you feel useless and you see no perspective, 
you are afraid you will use up your money. You are not motivated and you 
think about your situation again and again in a loop.” (Man, 18, Milan) 
In this sense, having a strategy for the future has an important impact on wellbeing: the three most 
concrete projects (finding a job, getting additional training, or emigrating) help young people to not 
surrender to their situation of distress, but to try to find renewed motivation to become active again. 
On the contrary, when they have no idea about the future, even getting a sound and comprehensive 
package of resources has little favorable impact on their self-esteem. 
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Particularly for those who are not pursuing a precise professional project, involvement in activation 
programs like training courses and protected jobs is also important for the recuperation of young 
people’s motivation, organization of time, and self-esteem. 
“At first I felt really bad. Now, since I am in the program, I don't feel 
unemployed anymore, and it's getting much better.” (Woman, 21, Bern) 
Nevertheless, if young people perceive that such an involvement has no real content, but is just an 
expedient that public services use for instance to justify the provision of income support, they will 
tend to use the services instrumentally in turn.  
“I just did what I had to do... I first had to do 2 job applications, then 3, then 
4... So I did all the basic things. I think ‘ok, I have to apply for jobs, and I 
want to work, but I am not going to send out 30 applications when I only have 
to do 10. Who's the fool then?’ […] Then, I too start thinking 
opportunistically: ‘ok, if you are going to stick to the rules, then I am going to 
stick to the rules too’.” (Man, 28, Amsterdam) 
The risk here is twofold: to make activation measures ineffective because of the rigidity of their 
implementation (Sabatinelli and Villa 2011), but also to (further) reduce the trust these young 
recipients have toward public welfare and activating services, especially when they feel compelled 
to accept jobs that are far below their level of skill, or that have a very short duration and/or very 
low pay. 
 
Conclusions [A] 
In this chapter we investigated the experience of vulnerability of young Europeans confronted with 
the discontinuity of their employment. We identified five profiles of work precariousness that differ 
in the degree of weakness, fragmentation and orientation of the path. Young unstable workers that 
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are neither characterized by a specific professional plan, nor that have been able to build a somehow 
coherent–albeit fragmented–career path, represent the weakest profile. The complex biographies of 
individuals in the “marginal and weak” profile have a strong influence that makes it more difficult 
for them to enter the labor market than for their peers. For the “precarious with fragmented paths”, 
determinants are also related to the recent deregulation in job contracts, entrapping some young 
people in an extremely short-term dynamic.  
There is a wide range of profiles in all our cities, although their relative importance is different 
(particularly those with a “precarious fragmented” or “flexible project-oriented” profile are more 
frequently found in the small- and medium-sized cities, where local labor markets are narrower). 
This suggests that the impacts of labor market transformations on the paths of young people are 
rather common throughout European countries.  
We then identified five different types of resource packages our respondents rely upon, comparing 
their size and composition, and the contribution of public welfare, market-based, family and 
primary network, and solidarity network. Whereas more than half of the respondents show a rather 
balanced resource package, leaning on all main pillars, two groups of interviewees overwhelmingly 
rely respectively on public welfare and on their family and primary network, while a last group has 
access only to a scant set of resources. The young people in the most risky position are those who 
depend upon a particularly weak or imbalanced resource package, since if that support should fail, 
they would be entirely exposed to contingencies. 
Although our sample does not allow us to generalize, it is interesting to note that there is a certain 
concentration of each resource package in different European geographical areas, with some 
correspondence to welfare regimes. The most generous resource package is most often found in our 
British, French, and Swiss cities (especially in Bern). The all-public package is mostly observed in 
continental cities, particularly Nantes, Münster, and the Dutch cities. The all-family package is most 
often found in eastern cities (especially Warsaw), while the scant packages are concentrated in the 
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small southern cities. This confirms that welfare protection for young people is comparatively 
minimal in the south and east of Europe, and also that in familistic welfare systems, when the 
family fails to support its members, there is barely any other buffer available. 
If we relate profiles of work precariousness and resource packages, a diversified picture emerges. 
Young adults with “interrupted careers” usually have access to an abundant resource package. They 
are entitled to public measures, since until some years ago they were stably integrated in the labor 
market; they also rely on the family and, despite their present situation and the influence of the 
crisis, they continue pursuing labor market reintegration. The “young and fragile” generally have 
resource packages that are abundant and well distributed across all the welfare pillars; they access a 
lot of support probably because thanks to their young age and difficult life experiences they are 
considered as deserving both by social services and by their primary network. “Flexible adults with 
a professional project” are usually rather well supported by welfare pillars (“diversified package”); 
their strong motivation towards their professional project eases a virtuous circle between their 
agency and the support they receive, and allows to emphasize the positive side of instability as 
opportunity. On the contrary, those young people who are greatly detached from the labor market, 
the long-term unemployed (“marginal and weak”), or the severely precarious with no professional 
plans (“precarious fragmented”) and who, at the same time, rely on an uneven (“all-public” or “all-
family”) or frail (“limited”) resource package bear a high risk of ending up economically deprived 
and socially excluded. Almost one third of our interviewees fall into this trap. Even more 
insidiously, more than one young person in ten in our sample is in the situation combining a 
“precarious fragmented” profile with a “limited” resource package, and is therefore dangerously 
exposed to commodification, with little support from family and public welfare. Most of them are 
concentrated in Southern Europe, where the labor market deregulation has not been compensated by 
an adequate reform of social security, which remains fragmented and barely effective in supporting 
young people.  
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Whereas the precariousness profiles cut across all our cities, the resource packages appear to be 
more diversified along a dividing line that in a way retraces a well-known cleavage, which separates 
Southern and Eastern Europe from the rest of the countries (Ferrera 1996, Cerami 2006). This may 
suggest that, while the deregulation of labor markets and flexibilization of job contracts has been 
rather transversal throughout Europe (although with differentiated weights in the different countries, 
OECD 2002), the composition of the mosaic of welfare resources remains more stuck to welfare 
regimes, also because changes in welfare policies are slower and more path-dependent than changes 
in economic regulation and the role of national entitlement remains strong, particularly in this 
policy area.  
As highlighted in chapter 3 in this book, in fact, local policies appear to be decisive in those cases in 
which the division of labor within the different institutional levels is well balanced, even if 
concretely it takes different forms. Some of the respondents benefiting from good support have 
been involved in widely encompassing local programs, like in Nantes. Others have benefited from a 
nationally set and locally implemented priority on labor market reintegration of young people, as in 
the British cities. Still others have profited from nationally (in Swedish cities) or regionally (in 
Dutch and Swiss cities) framed but locally specified support and activation programs. In contrast, 
southern and eastern cities are confronted with the vulnerability of young people who are scarcely 
protected by national and regional regulation and provision, but do not have enough competencies 
and resources to set up truly effective programs; they can only provide light forms of support, 
which are not able to make a real difference in the life chances of these young people (see chapter 
3). 
In conclusion, the analysis of the narratives of young Europeans shows how the role of locally-
implemented policies can be crucial in the path of young people experiencing instability. However, 
in order to be effective, truly empowering and activating, programs need to be flexible and 
encompassing, with the possibility to adapt specific contents to the differentiated needs and assets 
of young people. The youngest ones need to be proposed a training or working occasion as soon as 
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possible, even if short-termed, in order to prevent their shift into passivity. Those entrapped in 
fragmented paths, on the contrary, need orientation and support to build a coherent professional 
project that can take them out of work precariousness. Those with a precise project need support in 
pursuing it, while those who were stably employed in the past need to take advantage of their period 
of protection to get a new job. Finally, the most marginal ones need more encompassing support, 
including social assistance and family tutoring. Yet, the standardized, short-term orientation of 
many activation programs, and the risk–due to the current crisis and budget constraints – that they 
may be cut down, threatens their potential support to young people in their strive for autonomy and 
self-realization, especially in contexts where austerity interventions have greatly reduced resources 
for welfare measures. Especially in countries in which public regulation fails to protect those with 
more precarious profiles, growing numbers of young people risk to be strongly exposed to 
commodification and thus undergo a worsening in their social vulnerability. 
	 41	
References 
Barbieri P. and Scherer S. (2009) Labour Market Flexibilization and its Consequences in Italy. 
European Sociological Review, 25(6): 677-692. 
Bertolini S., Blossfeld H. and Hofäckerand D. (2011) Youth on globalized labour markets. Rising 
uncertainty and its effects on early employment and family lives in Europe. Opladen and 
Farmington Hills (MI): Barbara Budrich Publishers. 
Billari, F.C. (2004) “Becoming an Adult in Europe: A Macro(/Micro)-Demographic Perspective.” 
Demographic Research SC (SC):15-44. 
Blossfeld H., Klijzing, E., Mills M., and Kurz K. (2005) Globalization, uncertainty and youth in 
society. London and New York: Routledge. 
Cerami, A., (2006), Social policy in Central and Eastern Europe: The emergence of a new European 
welfare regime, LIT Verlag, Münster. 
Côté, J. and Bynner, J.M. (2008) Changes in the transition to adulthood in the UK and Canada: the 
role of structure and agency in emerging adulthood. Journal of Youth Studies, 11(3), pp.251-
268. 
Dietrich, H. (2012) Youth unemployment in Europe. Theoretical considerations and empirical 
findings. Available at: library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/09227.pdf. Last access: 16/7/2012. 
Escott, K. (2012) Young women on the margins of the labour market. Work, Employment & 
Society, 26(3), pp.412-428. 
Esping-Andersen, G. (with D. Gallie, A. Hemerijck, and J. Myles) (2002) Why We Need a New 
Welfare State, Oxford, Oxford University Press.  
European Foundation (2012) Recent policy developments related to those not in employment, 
education and training (NEETs), European Foundation, Dublin, 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/docs/erm/tn1109042s/tn1109042s.pdf  
	 42	
Ferrera, M. (1996), ‘The southern model of welfare in social Europe’, Journal of European Social 
Policy, 1: 17–37. 
Gallie, D. and Paugam, P. (eds.) (2000), Welfare Regimes and the Experience of Unemployment in 
Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Gebel, Michael and Giesecke, J (2011) “Labor Market Flexibility and Inequality: The Changing 
Skill-Based Temporary Employment and Unemployment Risks in Europe,” Social Forces 
90(1), 17–40. 
Greenhalgh, Leonard and Rosenblatt, Zehava (2010) “Evolution of Research on Job Insecurity,” 
International studies of Management & Organization 40(1), 6–19. 
Guillemard, Anne-Marie (2005) The advent of flexible life course and the reconfiguration of 
welfare, in Andersen,	Jørgen Goul, Guillemard, Anne-Marie, Jensen, Per H. and Pfau-Effinger, 
Birgit (eds) The changing face of welfare Consequences and outcomes from a citizenship 
perspective, the Policy Press,  
Isengard, B. (2003) Youth Unemployment: Individual Risk Factors and Institutional Determinants. 
A Case Study of Germany and the United Kingdom. Journal of Youth Studies, 6(4), pp.357-
376. 
Jahoda, M., Lazarsfeld, P. and Zeifel, H. (1933) (English trans. 1971) Marienthal. The Sociography 
of an Unemployed Community, Chicago, Ill.–New York, N.Y.: Aldine, Atherton. 
Kahn, LM (2007) “The Impact of Employment Protection Mandates on Demographic Temporary 
Employment Patterns: International Microeconomic Evidence*,” The Economic Journal 
117(521), 333–356. 
Kalleberg, a. L. (2009) “Precarious Work, Insecure Workers: Employment Relations in Transition,” 
American Sociological Review 74(1), 1–22. 
	 43	
Lancker V (2012) The European world of temporary employment: gendered and poor? European 
Societies, 14(1), 83–111. 
OECD (2002) Employment Outlook 2002. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Paris. 
OECD (2012) Employment Outlook 2012. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Paris,  
http://www.oecd.org/els/employmentpoliciesanddata/oecdemploymentoutlook.htm  
Ranci, C., 2010. Social vulnerability in Europe. The new configuration of social risks. London: 
Palgrave&Macmillan. 
Social Europe (2012) Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2012. European 
Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=9604&langId=en  
Standing G. (2011) The precariat: The new dangerous class. London-New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic. 
Walther A. (2006) Regimes of youth transitions: choice, flexibility and security in young people’s 
experiences across different European contexts. Young, 14(2): 119-139. 
Walther A. (2011) Risks and responsibilities? The individualisation of youth transitions and the 
ambivalence between participation and activation in Europe. Social Work & Society, 9(2): 1-6. 
WILCO WP2 National Reports, http://www.wilcoproject.eu/ 
WILCO WP3 City Reports, http://www.wilcoproject.eu/ 
